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lines. Increases are accentuated for judges with less experience and in polarized environments. During
periods of national unity—wartime, for example—judges suppress dissents, again, especially by judges
with less experience and in polarized environments. We show the dissent rate increases gradually from 6%
to nearly 12% in the quarter before an election and returns immediately to 6% after the election. If highly
experienced professionals making common law precedent can be politically primed, it raises questions
about the perceived impartiality of the judiciary.
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1 Introduction
Whether U.S. judges are biased is subject to much debate. The view of judges as impartial
has been questioned by studies showing that demographic characteristics of judges predict
their decisions on a range of legal issues (Peresie 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006). Politics, race,
and gender appear to affect judicial decisions (Schanzenbach 2005; Bushway and Piehl 2001;
Mustard 2001; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Albonetti 1997; Klein et al. 1978; Humphrey
and Fogarty 1987; Thomson and Zingraff 1981; Abrams et al. 2012; Boyd et al. 2010; Bonica
and Woodruff 2015; Bonica et al. 2016; Shayo and Zussman 2011; Guthrie et al. 2000, 2007;
Rachlinski et al. 2009b, 2013; Simon 2012). Whether these correlations reflect per se bias or
differences in legal philosophy is an open question (Kornhauser 1999). For example, a judge
may hew to a strict Constitutional interpretation on first principles, rather than choose the
preferred outcomes of a political party or group (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). In one judge’s
estimate, only 5–15% of cases are legally indeterminate and, even in these difficult cases,
judges understand which legal reasonings have greater plausibility (Edwards and Livermore
2008)—an argument against an interpretation of per se bias. We test if experienced judges
(mean experience = 10.3 y, SD = 7.5) on the U.S. Courts of Appeals are swayed by the
partisan environment of elections. Since previous findings of partisanship in judicial decisions
could be due to judges’ adherence to different legal philosophies, this present paper advances
the literature by utilizing the stability of judges’ legal philosophies over short time horizons to
eliminate legal philosophy as the source of temporarily altered patterns in judges’ concurrences
and dissents.
Prior research suggests that priming can increase temporarily the accessibility of knowledge
units in the memory of an individual, thus making it more likely that these knowledge units are
used in the reception, interpretation and judgment of subsequent external information (Bargh
and Chartrand 2000; Storms 1958; Higgins and Chaires 1980). An activated concept becomes
more likely than before to influence conscious judgments. One study documents priming effects
as long as one week after the initial stimulus (Tulving et al. 1982). The greater the quantity
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or concentration of primes, the stronger is the overall priming effect (Srull and Wyer 1979).
However, conscious processing, directed by an individual’s intentions and goals, can override
the usual or habitual response to priming (Bargh and Chartrand 2000); indeed, experienced
individuals are less prone to priming, while novices are more easily primed by news coverage
(Krosnick and Kinder 1990). We investigate whether, nearing the U.S. Presidential election,
judges become more likely to vote along partisan lines, disagree when sitting with judges
appointed by the opposite party, and issue decisions reflecting partisan views. If decisions are
affected, this would have permanent effects on the establishment of precedent (Gennaioli and
Shleifer 2007; Baker and Mezzetti 2012).
2 Data
Our data consists of 18,686 judicial rulings, collected over 77 years, by the 12 U.S. Circuit
Courts, also known as Courts of Appeals or Federal appellate courts. Each Circuit Court
presides over 3–9 states. Our case sample consisted of petitions related to economic activity
(50.9%), criminal law (26.9%), civil rights (8.6%), labor relations (7.2%), first amendment,
due process, and privacy (2.8%), miscellaneous (2.8%), and unable to be ascertained (0.8%).
The 12 U.S. Circuit Courts process all cases that are appealed from the U.S. District Courts.
Circuit judges are appointed for life by the U.S. President. Three judges, out of a pool of
8 to 40 judges in a Circuit, are randomly assigned by a staffing office to each case. For each
year we obtained a random sample of roughly 5% of cases. The majority of decisions were
unanimous (92%). Our database includes the legal variables that have been hand-coded by
prior researchers: variables include litigant type, litigant strategy, how many appellants or
respondents were persons, businesses, public interest groups, or government actors, whether
there was an issue of constitutionality, whether the court engaged in statutory interpretation,
whether the issue involved state or local law, an executive order or administrative regulation,
summary judgment, alternative dispute resolution, conflict of laws, international law, or agency
discretion. There are over one hundred coded characteristics.1
1Documentation and data for cases available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm. Bio-
graphical information for the judges in the database was obtained from the Multi-User Data Base
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When judges appointed by Democrats and Republicans vote in different ways, the legalist
interpretation is that they differ because they simply follow different legal philosophies rather
than demonstrating bias. For instance, a judge can derive from first principles an adherence to
a legal school of thought, while not necessarily hewing to the preferences of a political party
for a certain policy outcome. A variety of professional norms and institutional mechanisms
are designed to limit the influence of extrajudicial factors. Federal judges are restricted from
any semblance of impropriety. Judges are prohibited from receiving honoraria for speeches,
appearances, or articles and are prohibited from receiving compensation for their service to
a for-profit or non-profit organization.2 They are also prohibited from making speeches for
political organizations, publicly endorsing or opposing candidates, soliciting funds, making
contributions, or attending or purchasing tickets for events sponsored by political organizations
or candidates.3 They are further prohibited from personally participating in any fund-raising
activities, soliciting funds for any organization, or using or permitting the use of the prestige
of their judicial office for fund-raising purposes.4
The judges’ decisions are classified into two categories, “affirm” and “reverse.” On average,
57% of cases were affirmed. The panels’ decisions can be 3-0 (unanimous) or 2-1 (dissent). A
judge who disagrees with the verdict must write a dissent explaining why. The judges’ opinions
were also classified into three categories: liberal = 1, conservative = -1, and mixed or unable
on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges. Documentation and data for judges available at
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/auburndata.htm. Random assignment in Courts of Appeals has been exam-
ined in other work (Chen and Yeh 2016a,b; Chen et al. 2015). Case assignment in Circuit Courts fall into two
categories: 1) Once a case arrives, three randomly chosen judges are assigned to the case; 2) Once a year, judges
are randomly assigned to panels and each panel is assigned a date to hear cases. Then, when a case arrives,
it gets assigned to the next panel. It is well established and has been thoroughly tested that both procedures
are indeed random. For example, Chen and Sethi (2016) use data from Boyd et al. (2010) and Sunstein et al.
(2006), who code 19 case characteristics as determined by the lower court for 415 gender-discrimination Circuit
Court cases, and find that case characteristics are uncorrelated with judicial panel composition. Other papers
examine whether the sequence of judges assigned to cases in each Circuit Court mimics a random process.
They find, for example, that the string of judges assigned to cases is statistically indistinguishable from a
random string. This paper’s appendix report omnibus tests of whether case and litigant characteristics vary
over 4-year cycles, and Chen (2016) does the same for the caseloads and characteristics of judges authoring or
sitting on the panel.
2Guide to Judiciary Policy Canon 4H. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/conduct/vol02a-
ch02.pdf
3Guide to Judiciary Policy Canon 5.
4Guide to Judiciary Policy Canon 4C.
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to code = 0. For example, decisions supporting the position of the defendant in a criminal
procedure case, the plaintiff who asserts a violation of her First Amendment rights, and the
Secretary of Labor who sues a corporation for violation of child labor regulations are all coded
as "liberal.”5
3 Results
We find that the likelihood of a dissent is greater in the quarter preceding a Presidential
election than after an election or in other quarters over the election cycle. This pattern is
evident in Fig. 1, which graphs the proportion of dissents by quarter-to-election. The graph
shows that the likelihood of a dissent spikes in the quarter before the election—the probability
of a dissent steadily increases from 6% to nearly 12% and immediately returns back to 6%
after the election.
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5The Courts of Appeals Database Project states that for most, but not all issue categories, these will
correspond to notions of "liberal" and "conservative" that are commonly used in the public law literature.
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To account for the possible role of covariates in the patterns depicted in Fig. 1, we used a
multivariate regression with dissent as the dependent variable and a legal-topic fixed effect to
control for the idiosyncratic tendencies for dissent in each legal area, a calendar-quarter fixed
effect to control for the tendencies for dissent that change by season, a year fixed effect to
control for tendencies for dissent that change over time, Circuit Court fixed effect to control for
tendencies for dissent that vary by Circuit, and a divided-panel fixed effect to control for the
fact that dissents are more likely when judges appointed by Republicans and by Democrats
sit together (Tab. 1).
We use the linear probability model (OLS) as our primary estimation method, and show
that our results are robust to the use of probit models. There are two main reasons for this
choice. The first is that our objective is to estimate the correlation coefficients rather than to
develop a forecasting model of case outcomes, and OLS is superior for estimation purposes.
And second, probit is not well-suited to the use of regressions with controls for fixed effects
(e.g., dummies for quarter-to-election, legal topic, calendar-quarter, year, Circuit Court, and
divided-panel) because of the incidental parameters problem (Angrist and Pischke 2008), and
our analysis includes many controls for fixed effects.
The key predictors were indicators of a case’s temporal position: (i) dummy variables in-
dicating the first three quarters before an election, included to examine how opinions imme-
diately before an election differ from after an election; and (ii) dummies indicating whether
Democratic and Republican appointees had been assigned on the same panel. To benchmark
the findings, panels with judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats are 1.5 percentage
points more likely to have a dissent relative to panels with judges appointed by only one party,
but panels in the quarter before an election are 6.4 percentage points more likely to have a
dissent relative to after an election. Thus the election effect is four times greater than the split
panel effect.6
6Chen (2016) reports that a linear model of proximity to an election would attribute 23% of dissents
from unelected U.S. Courts of Appeals judges to the President’s electoral proximity. This suggests that—if
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(1) (2)
Mean of dep. var.
Divided (DRR or RDD) 0.0157*** 0.0154***
(0.00452) (0.00450)
Quartertoelect = 1 0.0637*** 0.0680***
(0.0123) (0.0135)
Quartertoelect = 2 0.0347*** 0.0341**
(0.0121) (0.0145)
Quartertoelect = 3 0.0325*** 0.0343**
(0.0123) (0.0133)
Quartertoelect = 4 0.00581 0.00582
(0.0111) (0.0111)
Quartertoelect = 5 0.0209 0.0251
(0.0152) (0.0159)
Quartertoelect = 6 0.0120 0.0115
(0.0141) (0.0153)
Quartertoelect = 7 0.0226 0.0238
(0.0141) (0.0153)
Quartertoelect = 8 0.00772 0.00870
(0.0141) (0.0142)
Quartertoelect = 9 -0.0115 -0.00718
(0.0155) (0.0157)
Quartertoelect = 10 -0.0114 -0.0110
(0.0160) (0.0168)
Quartertoelect = 11 0.000311 0.00269
(0.0162) (0.0167)
Quartertoelect = 12 -0.0102 -0.00929
(0.0128) (0.0129)
Quartertoelect = 13 0.00115 0.00451
(0.0148) (0.0151)
Quartertoelect = 14 -0.0157 -0.0159
(0.0134) (0.0147)
Quartertoelect = 15 -0.0176 -0.0154
(0.0117) (0.0121)
Year FE Yes Yes
Circuit FE Yes Yes
Season FE No Yes
Legal Issue FE No Yes
Observations 18686 18686
R-squared 0.019 0.021
Table 1: Electoral Cycles in Dissents (2-1 Decision)
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). The omitted dummy variable indicating the number of quarters remaining before the
presidential election is 16 quarters.  
0.079
the estimate that 5–15% of cases are legally indeterminate is accurate (Edwards and Livermore 2008)—on
average, all of them may be affected by elections.
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The first three quarters before an election have coefficients that are positively signed and
statistically significant, confirming that the pattern in Fig. 1 is robust to controlling for the
legal attributes of the case. The results are extremely similar in analyses where we drop one
Circuit at a time (Tab. S1). In addition, we rerun our basic specification with each quarter
randomly assigned to a different quarter-to-election (a natural bootstrap with 200 draws);
the 95% interval for t-statistics is between positive and negative 2.62. Fig. S1 shows that our
true t-statistic of 4.01 lies far to the right of all the other simulated t-statistics. Several other
simulated t-statistics are close to the true t-statistic, but this is to be expected since the second
and third quarter before an election also display significant increases in dissents. Fig. S1 also
displays the t-statistics for changes in the quarter before Presidential elections for over one
hundred case and litigant characteristics. We find no increase or decrease before Presidential
elections along these dimensions. We analyzed another statistical model that simply includes
the linear trend that is apparent before elections in Fig. 1; regardless of the measure of electoral
proximity we used, the trend was negative and significant and the results are nearly identical
with probit estimates (Tab. S1).7
A separate paper by one of the authors replicates the electoral cycles in judicial dissents,
at the monthly level, for the universe of 293,868 cases coded for dissents from 1950 to 2007
(Chen 2016). Unlike this paper, a noticeable increase in dissents also appears in the 9th quarter
before a Presidential election; this time period is during the midterm elections, when all U.S.
House and one third of U.S. Senate seats are up for election. The 5% sample used for this
paper may be too small to observe significant midterm effects in dissents.8
7The following robustness checks are reported in Chen (2016): 1) shifting seasonality controls by one month
(January through March, etc.); 2) including dummy indicators for each type of panel composition (DDD,
DDR, RRD, RRR); 3) controlling for the presence of a concurrence, which also display electoral cycles; 4)
clustering standard errors at the Circuit level.
8Another replication by one of the authors uses machine learning to predict agreement between judges (Chen
et al. 2016a,f). Random forest achieves the best classification and it shows that electoral proximity is one of the
most important features predicting dissent. Moreover, consistent with the role of identity, dissent is roughly
half-driven by shared biographical features of judges. Thus, while only a small portion of dissent is explained
by political factors (Tabs. 1 and 2), electoral proximity and identity are both important in predicting dissent.
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Next, we examine heterogeneity. In particular, we can examine whether the increase in dis-
sents is larger for panels with judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats. Fig. 2 reports
group means. A large proportion of the increase in dissents comes from ideologically divided
panels. For unified panels, the dissent rate is 5.8% increasing to 6.7% before Presidential
elections, while for divided panels, the dissent vote rate is 7.3% increasing to 11.7%.9
0.0%	 2.0%	 4.0%	 6.0%	 8.0%	 10.0%	 12.0%	 14.0%	
Last	Quarter	-	Divided	
Last	Quarter	-	Unified	
Not	Last	Quarter	-	Divided	
Not	Last	Quarter	-	Unified	
Dissent	Rate	(Case-Level)	
Figure	2:	Judicial	Panel	Characteris<cs	and	
Electoral	Cycles	in	Dissents	
We next analyzed judges’ vote ideology, specifically, whether judges appointed by Democrats
9Several statistical tests for significant differences across groups are presented Chen (2016). The results
of Fig. 2 are significantly different for divided panels. Behavioral changes are three times greater in close
elections, non-existent in landslide elections, and reversed in wartime elections. Increases in dissents before
elections are twice as large in the time period since the 1970s—a magnitude that is consistent with the increase
in polarization found in studies of the U.S. Congress. Dissents are also elevated in swing states and in states
that count heavily to winning the election, when these states are competitive.
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were more likely to cast a liberal vote and judges appointed by Republicans more likely to cast
a conservative vote. Vote ideology measures a behavior different from dissents. For example,
if legal precedent dictates a liberal decision, a unified panel appointed by Republicans should
cast a liberal vote. Before a Presidential election, however, such a panel may actually cast a
conservative vote instead. There would be no dissent observed, but an alignment between the
decision and the judges’ party of appointment would be observed.
We observe that the ideological difference between Democratic appointees and Republican
appointees doubles in magnitude in the quarter before an election (Tab. 2 Panel A). The pos-
itive coefficient on the dummy indicator for whether the judge was appointed by a Democrat
indicates that Democratic appointees typically cast more liberal votes than Republican ap-
pointees. When the outcome measure is coded as liberal vs. not liberal, the interpretation of
the regression coefficient is that Democratic appointees are 3.5 percentage points more likely
than Republican appointees to cast a liberal vote relative to a neutral or conservative vote,
but this difference increases by another 3.9 percentage points before the election.
Decisions issued by unified panels (with three Republican or three Democratic appointees)
are also more likely to reach partisan conclusions before Presidential elections. Panels with
three Democratic appointees are 7.5 percentage points more likely to issue a liberal verdict
than panels with three Republican appointees (Tab. 2 Panel B). Because case types should be
evenly distributed across panel composition and across the electoral cycle, one might expect
no increase in the correlation between the panel’s party of appointment and the case outcome
before elections. Precedent dictating a liberal outcome should be just as likely to appear
before Democratic appointee panels as Republican appointee panels. In the quarter before
a Presidential election, however, differences between panels with three Republican or three
Democratic appointees double.
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Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Code +1 vs. 0/-1 +1/0 vs. -1
Mean of dep. var. 0.340 0.503
Judge appointed by Democrat 0.0849*** 0.0708*** 0.0348*** 0.0359***
(0.00910) (0.00821) (0.00416) (0.00462)
Judge appointed by Democrat 0.0684** 0.0712* 0.0394* 0.0319*
  * Last Quarter (0.0335) (0.0365) (0.0211) (0.0177)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Circuit FE No Yes Yes Yes
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes
Legal Issue FE No Yes Yes Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE No Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 56058 56058 56058 56058
R-squared 0.002 0.087
Panel B
Mean of dep. var. 0.344 0.517
Panel appointed by Democrat 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.0753*** 0.0883***
(0.0257) (0.0302) (0.0165) (0.0160)
Panel appointed by Democrat 0.217* 0.207* 0.0828 0.124*
  * Last Quarter (0.124) (0.125) (0.0683) (0.0633)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Circuit FE No Yes Yes Yes
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes
Legal Issue FE No Yes Yes Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE No Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5659 5659 5659 5659
R-squared 0.011 0.101
Table 2: Electoral Cycles in the Correlation between Party of Appointment and Judges' Votes
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01). Panel A: Vote-level regression. The outcome variable is Liberal Vote, which is coded as 1 for liberal, 0
for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for conservative. Panel B: Case-level regression. The outcome variable is
Liberal Precedent. 
-0.157
+1/0/-1
Vote Ideology
Vote Ideology
Politically unified panels (DDD or RRR)
-0.139
Fig. 3 plots the partial correlation between party of appointment and vote ideology for
each quarter before an election. Before the election, the partial correlation is a little over 0.15,
which is roughly twice the average partial correlation. This means that the ideological effect is
similar whether comparing to the quarter after an election or comparing to all other quarters.
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Changing the vote ideology of unified panels is one way for judges’ decisions to impact
development of law, but the direct impact on the District Court decision is another. Since
District Court judges are also politically appointed, we may expect, on average, that Circuit
and District Court judges disagree more before elections and for this to be reflected in an
increase in reversals and decrease in affirmations of the lower court decisions. We find that
Circuit Courts are 5.9 percentage points less likely to affirm and 5.2 percentage points more
likely to reverse the District Courts in the quarter before an election relative to after (Tab.
3).10
10Several additional aspects of behavioral change are considered in Chen (2016). Dissents occur shortly
before publication, increase with monthly increases in campaign ads, and appear for cases whose legal topic,
economic activity, is most heavily covered by campaign ads. Substituting the date of the publication with
dates for any of seven earlier stages of a case (available in linked administrative data) suggests that the exact
time at which a judge decides to dissent during Presidential elections occurs shortly before the publication
of an opinion (not the date of oral argument, as conventually assumed). The elevation of dissents correspond
to the timing of Presidential primaries. Non-swing states—which are relatively less important during the
12
(1) (2)
Affirm Reverse
Mean of dep. var. 0.568 0.269
Last Quarter -0.0588** 0.0519***
(0.0251) (0.0166)
Year FE Yes Yes
Circuit FE Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes
Legal Issue FE Yes Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE Yes Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE Yes Yes
Observations 18686 18686
R-squared 0.054 0.025
Table 3: Electoral Cycles in Treatment of Lower Courts
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year
level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). 
We now turn to the role of experience to further investigate whether the characteristics that
make individuals more susceptible to priming in the lab are found in the field. Experimental
research has found that inexperience magnifies priming effects (Krosnick and Kinder 1990).
Tab. 4 re-estimates our basic specification for sub-samples of judges grouped by the number of
years they have served as Circuit judges. Overall, judges are 1.7 percentage points more likely
to cast a dissenting vote before a Presidential election (Row 1). (This analysis differs from
Tab. 1 because we analyze dissents at the individual vote level rather than at the panel level.)
For judges with 1 or 2 years of experience, the magnitude of this effect is a considerably larger
3.4 percentage points. The point estimates are accentuated for inexperienced judges. The
point estimates are also positive and occasionally statistically significant for other experience
groups, e.g., 7–8 years of experience. Inexperienced judges being more likely to dissent before
general election—are relatively more important during the primary season because many states allocate votes
by proportional rule rather than by plurality. The relative elevation of the importance of non-swing states
(further elevated due to the importance of momentum) early in the election cycle can be seen in data on
campaign advertisements—and in the elevation of dissents. Thus, a contributing factor can be media affecting
the behavior of judges (Lim et al. 2015; Arceneaux et al. 2016), though, to be sure, the election could directly
affect workplaces rather than solely through media. Dissents before elections also appear on more marginal
cases that cite miscellaneous discretionary issues and procedural (rather than substantive) arguments, which
the Supreme Court appears to recognize and only partly remedy.
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a Presidential election would be consistent with judges taking awhile to develop the strong
professional, conscious commitments that would otherwise control the influence of unconscious
bias (Rachlinski et al. 2009a).
(1) (2)
Dissent Vote N
Last Quarter 0.0174*** 56058
  (All Experience) (0.00415)
Last Quarter 0.0343*** 6314
  (Experience = 1-2) (0.0116)
Last Quarter 0.00976 6526
  (Experience = 3-4) (0.0147)
Last Quarter 0.0261 6075
  (Experience = 5-6) (0.0185)
Last Quarter 0.0283*** 5644
  (Experience = 7-8) (0.0106)
Last Quarter 0.0173 5041
  (Experience = 9-10) (0.0166)
Last Quarter -0.0256 4390
  (Experience = 11-12) (0.0159)
Last Quarter 0.0341* 3605
  (Experience = 13-14) (0.0192)
Last Quarter 0.00159 3002
  (Experience = 15-16) (0.0166)
Last Quarter 0.0212 2288
  (Experience = 17-18) (0.0256)
Last Quarter 0.00878 2737
  (Experience = 19-21) (0.0134)
Last Quarter 0.0188 3033
  (Experience = 22-27) (0.0135)
Last Quarter -0.00982 1292
  (Experience = 28-35) (0.0226)
Year FE Yes
Circuit FE Yes
Season FE Yes
Legal Issue FE Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE Yes
Each coefficient represents a separate regression
Table 4: Judicial Experience and Electoral Cycles in Dissents
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01). The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the case was decided
in the quarter immediately preceding a presidential election. Numbers in Column 3 do not sum up to the
sample size in the first row as some cases have judges with years of experience outside the displayed range.
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If elections prime partisan identities, what about wartime, which can prime national iden-
tity? Fig. 4 shows that dissents decrease during wars, whose official dates are indicated by the
vertical lines.11
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This result is robust to regression controls (Tab. 5). Notably, the decrease in dissent rates
during wartime is largely attributed to divided panels (Col. 1) and inexperience (Col. 2).12
The coefficient on the non-interacted term, war, is insignificant, while the coefficients on the
interaction terms are large and negative. Since 70% of panels are divided, the average effect of
11Dates come from the International Crisis Behavior Project. Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Inter-
national Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–2001 (ICPSR Study No. 9286, 2004), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
We consider the following wars: World War II: 12/7/41–8/14/45; Korea: 6/27/50–7/27/53; Vietnam:
2/7/65–1/27/73; Gulf: 1/16/91–4/11/91; Afghanistan: 10/7/01–3/14/02. Further references on the question
of judicial decision making during war are provided in a separate paper (Chen 2016).
12We display results using 10 years of experience as the cut-off, but the finding is robust to other experience
thresholds.
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wartime is also negative. Moreover, divided panels, which are usually 2 percentage points more
likely to dissent than unified panels, are 0.6 percentage points less likely to dissent during war.
In sum, judges who are less experienced and sitting on divided panels are both more likely to
dissent before Presidential elections and more likely to not dissent during wartime.13
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dissent (2-1 Decision) Dissent Vote Affirm Reverse
Mean of dep. var. 0.079 0.023 0.568 0.269
Divided 0.0198*** 0.00720*** -0.0139* 0.0138*
(0.00499) (0.00150) (0.00775) (0.00731)
War 0.00992 0.00172 0.0459*** -0.0304***
(0.00869) (0.00317) (0.0113) (0.0102)
Divided * War -0.0263***
(0.00972)
Inexperience (≤ 10 Years) 0.00469*
(0.00264)
Inexperience * War -0.00835**
(0.00395)
Year (linear time trend) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Circuit FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Issues FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge FE No Yes No No
Observations 18686 49374 18686 18686
R-squared 0.014 0.024 0.019 0.006
Table 5: Judicial Decisions During Wartime
Notes: Robust OLS standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p
< 0.01). 
During wartime judges are also more likely to affirm and less likely to reverse lower court
decisions (Col. 3-4) and these effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.
A key aspect for interpreting the association between the temporal position of a case and
decisions is whether an unobserved factor determines case order in such a way that yields the
pattern of results we obtain. For instance, if cases involving contentious issues were somehow
more likely to appear before an election, we would naturally find a greater proportion of
dissents occurring before the election as well. Two procedural factors preclude this possibility.
13Chen (2016)reports the effects of individual wars.
16
First and most critically, the cases are randomly assigned. Thus, the judge cannot decide
to take contentious cases before an election. Second, displacing controversial cases to a later
time can not explain the wartime results; wars can last for several years, and court guidelines
limit the ability to delay cases for that long.
4 Discussion
Alternative explanations of electoral cycles are explored elsewhere including career con-
cerns, reputational capital, desire to impact the election, learning, and mood (Chen 2016).
A combination of logic, empirical evidence, and institutional rules prevent these mechanisms
from fully explaining the results. First, the fact that increases in dissents before elections are
not matched one-to-one with decreases after elections means that the results are not due to
time-shifting of dissents or cases. Second, the results are not due to career concerns. Judges
elevated to the Supreme Court and potential Supreme Court nominees are neither more or less
likely to dissent before Presidential elections. Nor are judges who are about to retire after the
election differentially likely to dissent before elections. Third, dissenting before the election is
uncorrelated with the candidate from the judge’s party winning the election. Even if judges
were motivated to spur additional voting, behavioral changes should be observed in all states
within a Circuit since decisions are promulgated at the Circuit—not state—level. For example,
consider the Sixth Circuit, which includes Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan. Through random
assignment to panels, judges from these three states may be assigned to the same case, and the
judge from Ohio or Michigan is more likely to dissent than the Tennessee judge. Behavioral
changes are greatest in states pivotal to the election where popular votes count heavily for
the Presidential election and in media markets where campaign advertisements are greatest.
Fourth, judges are not likely to be signalling to their state’s electorate and politicians when
they may be paying attention—no discernible effect is observed for elections of politician that
is closest in physical proximity (the state governor) and newspapers are no more or less likely
to report on Circuit decisions or their dissents before elections.14 Fifth, the results are not
14Furthermore, judges gain no benefit in likelihood of elevation to the Supreme Court.
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about learning (Lenz 2009). If judges are learning from elections, then elevated dissents should
persist after the election, but they do not. Judges are also not supposed to be learning from
elections, nor are they supposed to base their decisions on what they learn about political
parties.15 Sixth, the results are not only about mood (Saunders Jr. 1993; Edmans et al. 2007;
Simonsohn 2010; Card and Dahl 2011), since mood shifts would affect all judges. However,
when judges who are close in ideology scores sit together but are from different parties, the
rate at which they disagree triples before a Presidential election; and when judges from the
same party sit together, if one dissents, the one with the ideology score more distant from the
other party dissents more.16
5 Conclusion
This paper examines whether U.S. judges are illegitimately biased by political environment.
Many studies have examined inter-judge differences in decision-making where the differences
are attributed to politics (Peresie 2005; Sunstein et al. 2006). However, inter-judge differences
can always be interpreted as being due to something else, like legal philosophy (Kornhauser
1999). This paper documents intra-judge differences and rules out legal philosophies as an
explanatory factor since judges’ legal philosophies should be stable over short time horizons.
Increasing partisanship in recent years (McCarty et al. 2006) may have contributed to de-
creasing trust in political institutions, one consequence of which may be legal non-compliance
(Tyler 2006; Tyler and Huo 2002). The findings that U.S. Courts of Appeals judges make
decisions before Presidential elections in a partisan manner raise general questions about the
primeability of highly trained professionals with strong commitments to be unbiased. We can-
15Behavioral factors plausibly affect judicial outcomes in ways that need not be about learning. See, for
example, snap or predetermined judgments (Chen et al. 2016c), gambler’s fallacy (Chen et al. 2016e), mental
accounting (Chen and Philippe 2017), masculinity (Chen et al. 2016h,g), mimicry (Chen et al. 2016b), visual
cues (Chen et al. 2016d), implicit egoism (Chen and Prescott 2016), racial heirarchy (Chen and Prescott
2017b), and prosecutorial discretion (Chen and Prescott 2017a).
16That is not to say that mood does not generally affect judicial decisions. For example, asylum judges are
more likely to grant asylum—and U.S. district judges are more lenient—on the day after a home-city Sunday
NFL football game win instead of a loss and on days with good weather (Chen 2017b). Eren and Mocan (2016)
also finds that emotions affect judicial decisions on juvenile defendants, especially minority defendants. The
explanatory power of sports and weather persist after employing the best prediction models of asylum and
sentencing decisions (Barry et al. 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016).
18
not rule out the possibility that highly trained professionals—who profess to be unbiased—are
in fact biased, which would raise separate questions about pervasive bias. Indeed, less than
1% of federal judges report political motivations for retirements and resignations, but 13%
of retirements and 36% of resignations are politically motivated (Chen 2017a),17 raising the
question of self-deception when claiming to be fair and impartial. Taken together, these results
contribute to a theoretical discussion of balance of powers. Linz (1990) argues that conflicts
arising in presidential systems between the president and congress can threaten democratic
life. Our results raise the question of another conflict. If the judiciary becomes polarized and
sclerotized in a manner that stymies the natural democratic churn of institutions, this can
lead to additional conflicts between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
17In order to calculate the share of judicial exits that are politically motivated, Chen (2017a) makes the
following assumptions. First, assume that the benchmark is random exits spread evenly over 16 quarters
between elections and evenly without regards to the party of the appointing President. On average, 0.14
judges voluntarily leave the bench (0.12 are retirements and 0.02 are resignations) each month. Next, calculate
the deviation from the baseline in the quarters before or after an election when the party in power is such that
it would be politically strategic to exit. In each of the three quarters before a Presidential election, the number
of retirements for judges when the party in power is different drops by 0.08-0.10 per month. To interpret the
magnitudes, assuming that random exits would render 0.124 ∗ 48 = 5.95 judges to retire every 4 years, the
comparison yields the abnormal number of judges not retiring before the election. Regression coefficients in
the three quarters (each containing 3 months) prior to election indicates that (0.079 + 0.076 + 0.107) ∗ 3 =
0.79 judges are missing, which suggests 13% of judicial retirements are politically motivated. An analogous
calculation yields 36% of resignations to be politically motivated.
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(1) (2) (3)
Mean of dep. var.
OLS Probit Drop 1 Circuit
Quarters to Election -0.00284*** -0.00293***
(0.000709) (0.000765)
Last Quarter
  All Circuits
Last Quarter 0.0686***
  Circuit 1 (0.0142)
Last Quarter 0.0679***
  Circuit 2 (0.0142)
Last Quarter 0.0639***
  Circuit 3 (0.0136)
Last Quarter 0.0715***
  Circuit 4 (0.0138)
Last Quarter 0.0729***
  Circuit 5 (0.0138)
Last Quarter 0.0627***
  Circuit 6 (0.0130)
Last Quarter 0.0706***
  Circuit 7 (0.0142)
Last Quarter 0.0714***
  Circuit 8 (0.0143)
Last Quarter 0.0674***
  Circuit 9 (0.0135)
Last Quarter 0.0713***
  Circuit 10 (0.0149)
Last Quarter 0.0685***
  Circuit 11 (0.0139)
Last Quarter 0.0603***
  Circuit 12 (0.0145)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Circuit FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes
Legal Issue FE Yes Yes Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE No No Yes
Appendix Table S1: Electoral Cycles in Dissents - Additional Robustness Checks
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01). The explanatory variables of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether it is the last quarter
before an election (Column 3) or a continuous variable for quarters to election (Columns 1-2). Marginal effect
from a probit specification of dissent on continuous variable for quarters to election in Column 2.
0.079
Each coefficient represents a 
separate OLS regression.
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